Human rights, non-refoulement and the protection of refugees in Hong Kong by Loper, K
Title Human rights, non-refoulement and the protection of refugees inHong Kong
Author(s) Loper, K
Citation International Journal Of Refugee Law, 2010, v. 22 n. 3, p. 404-439
Issued Date 2010
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/92989
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
 Human Rights, Non-refoulement and the Protection of Refugees in Hong Kong 
Kelley Loper* 




Although the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol do not 
apply to Hong Kong, asylum seekers have challenged Hong Kong’s lack of an adequate 
refugee policy in a series of judicial review actions grounded in human rights and common 
law principles.   This article focuses on two cases in particular in which the applicants have 
attempted to rely, in part, on a right to non-refoulement derived from international and 
domestic law to compel the Government to establish procedures to determine the status of 
refugees and other similar categories of claimants.  The first, Secretary for Security v. 
Sakthevel Prabakar, led to the creation of a ‘torture screening’ mechanism based on article 3 
of the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.  In the second, C v. Director of Immigration, the court considered whether a rule 
of non-refoulement has emerged in customary international law and, if so, whether it applies 
to Hong Kong and requires government-administered refugee status determination.  Although 
the applicants failed at first instance,1 an analysis of the judgment with reference to Hong 
Kong’s human rights obligations reveals gaps in the court’s reasoning and demonstrates 
potential for greater reliance on these standards as the basis for developing a more 
comprehensive protection framework.  This examination of the Hong Kong experience may 
have broader comparative value, especially in the Asian region and in jurisdictions not bound 
by the Refugee Convention or its Protocol. 
 
1. Introduction 
                                                          
*Assistant Professor, Director of the LLM in Human Rights Programme, Deputy Director of the Centre for 
Comparative and Public Law, Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong.  The author would like to thank 
Oliver Jones, Puja Kapai, Simon Young and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on earlier 
drafts of this article; Mark Daly and Peter Barnes for informative discussions of the cases; and Benjamin Chan 
Kui Pang for his helpful research assistance. 
1 The Hong Kong Court of Appeal (CA) considered the applicants’ appeal in Jan. 2010 and the judgment was 
still pending at the time of writing.  The case is expected to eventually reach the Court of Final Appeal (CFA), 
Hong Kong’s highest judicial organ. 
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Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of 
China on 1 July 1997 and has since been governed by a mini-constitution, the Basic Law, 
which guarantees Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy in all areas except foreign affairs 
and defense.2  When exercising this autonomy, Hong Kong has the power to ‘apply 
immigration controls into, stay in and departure from the Region by persons from foreign 
states and regions’,3 and thus may develop municipal law and policy toward asylum seekers 
and refugees without input from the central authorities in Beijing.  Although China has 
acceded to both the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Refugee 
Convention’) and its 1967 Protocol and has extended these instruments to the Macau SAR, 
Hong Kong has resisted their application to its territory.4  Hong Kong legislation currently 
does not mention asylum seekers or refugees – or other similar categories of individuals 
seeking protection from a return to serious violations of human rights - and the Government 
maintains a firm policy not to grant asylum.5 
Despite this official position, Hong Kong is nonetheless bound by seven core 
international human rights instruments6 which, with some exceptions,7 enumerate relevant 
rights – including explicit and implicit guarantees of non-refoulement - that extend to all 
persons within a state party’s jurisdiction.  The principle of non-refoulement imposes a duty 
on states to refrain from returning a person to a jurisdiction where he/she may face serious 
violations of human rights.  For example, article 3 of the Convention against Torture and 
                                                          
2 According to art. 2 of the Basic Law, ‘[t]he National People’s Congress authorizes the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region to exercise a high degree of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative and independent 
judicial power, including that of final adjudication, in accordance with the provisions of this Law’.  Chapter II 
elaborates the relationship between the Central authorities and the Hong Kong SAR. 
3 Basic Law, art. 154. 
4 Prior to 1997, Hong Kong similarly resisted extension of the Convention under British rule.  See R. Mushkat, 
‘Refuge in Hong Kong’ (1989) 1 IJRL 449-480  at 451 and R. Mushkat, ‘Refugees in Hong Kong: Legal 
Provisions and Policies’ (1980) 10 HKLJ 169-181. According to art. 153 of the Basic Law, the Central 
Government is responsible for deciding whether to extend its international obligations to Hong Kong after 
consulting the Hong Kong Government: ‘The application to the [SAR] of international agreements to which the 
People’s Republic of China is or becomes a party shall be decided by the Central People’s Government, in 
accordance with the circumstances and needs of the Region, and after seeking the views of the government of 
the region …’ 
5 Security Bureau, ‘Torture Claim Screening Mechanism: Enhanced Mechanism and Way Forward’, LC Paper 
No. CB(2)370/09-10(03), Nov. 2009, para. 9 and Security Bureau, ‘The Administration’s Response to the Joint 
Submission of the Law Society and the Bar Association to the LegCo Panel on Security on Legal Representation 
for CAT Claimants Dated 24.9.2009’, LC Paper No. CB(2)33/09-10(01), 9 Oct. 2009, para. 7. 
6 These include the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 
1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
the 1984 Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the 
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities. 
7 For example, ICCPR art. 25 which provides for the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right 
to vote and to be elected, and to have access to public service. 
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other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (‘Torture Convention’) 
explicitly prohibits the expulsion or return (‘refouler’) of a person to another state where 
there are substantial grounds for believing that he/she would be in danger of being subjected 
to torture.8  In addition, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
includes an implicit right to non-refoulement when ‘there is a real risk that [an individual’s] 
rights under the Covenant will be violated in another jurisdiction’.9  These provisions have 
been implemented in Hong Kong law through the Basic Law and Part II of the 1991 Bill of 
Rights Ordinance,10 which largely replicates the ICCPR.  Hong Kong courts have 
demonstrated their willingness to engage with international standards generally and 
frequently refer to international and comparative human rights materials when interpreting 
constitutional rights.11 
Although the Government has not explicitly recognized that these provisions impose a 
legal duty to protect non-refoulement claimants in Hong Kong, it has nevertheless been 
piecing together a patchwork of refugee-related policies in recent years in response to a series 
of judicial review applications.  In one set of cases, asylum seekers have challenged the lack 
of adequate government-administered mechanisms for determining refugee status and claims 
under article 3 of the Torture Convention.  They have argued, in part, that Hong Kong has 
                                                          
8 Art. 3(1): ‘No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.  (2) For the purpose of 
determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant 
considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, 
flagrant or mass violations of human rights’. 
9 See Human Rights Committee, A.R.J. v. Australia, Communication No. 692/1996, UN doc. 
CCPR/C/60/D/692/1996, 11 Aug. 1997, para. 6.8 and Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, 
‘The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant’, UN doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May, 2004, para. 12. 
10 Cap. 383. 
11 See, for example, R v. Sin Yau-ming (1991) 1 HKPLR 88 at 107.  In this case, the Court of Appeal held that 
when interpreting the Bill of Rights, guidance ‘can be derived from decisions taken in common law jurisdictions 
which contain a constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights. We can also be guided by decisions of the European 
Court of Human Rights … and the European Human Rights Commission ... Further, we can bear in mind the 
comments and decisions of the United Nations Human Rights Committee … I would hold none of these to be 
binding upon us though in so far as they reflect the interpretation of articles in the Covenant, and are directly 
related to Hong Kong legislation, I would consider them as of the greatest assistance and give to them 
considerable weight’.  Art. 84 of the Basic Law provides that the courts ‘may refer to precedents of other 
common law jurisdictions’.  In Director of Immigration v. Chong Fung Yuen (2001) 4 HKCFAR 211, the court 
confirmed that ‘the courts should give a generous interpretation to the provisions in Chapter III [of the Basic 
Law] that contain constitutional guarantees of freedoms that lie at the heart of Hong Kong’s separate system’.  
For a discussion of Hong Kong’s use of international standards, see C.J. Petersen, ‘Embracing Universal 
Standards? The Role of International Human Rights Treaties in Constitutional Jurisprudence’ in H.L. Fu, L. 
Harris, S.N.M. Young (eds.),  Interpreting Hong Kong's Basic Law: the struggle for coherence (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 33-53; A. Mason ‘The Place of Comparative Law in Developing the Jurisprudence 
on the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Hong Kong’ (2007) 37 HKLJ 299-317; J.M.M. Chan, ‘Basic Law and 
Constitutional Review, The First Decade’ (2007) 37 HKLJ 407-447; and J.M.M. Chan, ‘Hong Kong’s Bill of 
Rights: Its Reception of and Contribution to International and Comparative Jurisprudence’ (1998) 47 ICLQ 306-
336. 
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domestic legal obligations to avoid refoulement and must, therefore, establish fair screening 
procedures to provide sufficient safeguards.   
In Secretary for Security v. Sakthevel Prabakar (Prabakar),12 the Court of Final 
Appeal (CFA) determined that Hong Kong’s policy to comply with article 3 of the Torture 
Convention – as expressed in the Government’s report to the UN Committee against Torture 
in 1999 -  must be implemented according to high standards of fairness.  This case led to the 
creation of a ‘torture screening’ mechanism which is administered by the Hong Kong 
Immigration Department. 
In a later case, C v. Director of Immigration (C),13 the Court of First Instance (CFI) 
considered whether a principle of non-refoulement exists in customary international law and, 
if so, whether it applies to Hong Kong and mandates government-administered refugee status 
determination.  Currently, the Hong Kong Sub-office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) considers refugee claims but their procedures cannot be challenged in 
Hong Kong courts and have been criticized for a lack of transparency.14  In C, the court held 
that although non-refoulement has crystallized as a rule of customary international law, it is 
inconsistent with Hong Kong law – or has been repudiated by the Hong Kong authorities - 
and therefore does not apply and does not require the establishment of a screening 
mechanism. Neither the CFA in Prabakar nor the CFI in C ultimately decided whether the 
Government has non-refoulement obligations under the Torture Convention, the ICCPR, as 
incorporated into domestic law, or a broad principle in customary international law which 
goes beyond the scope of the Refugee Convention’s provisions.15  An examination of these 
standards, however, demonstrates a large measure of consistency between non-refoulement 
and the Hong Kong constitutional framework.  Because considerable overlap exists between 
refugees and other categories of protection claimants fleeing serious human rights violations, 
reliance on human rights could move Hong Kong toward a more comprehensive screening 
mechanism and also provide the basis for more robust judicial review of relevant policy. 
                                                          
12 Secretary for Security v. Sakthevel Prabakar [2005] 1 HKLRD 289. 
13 C v. Director of Immigration [2008] HKCU 256. 
14 For discussion of the critique of the UNHCR’s procedural limitations in the Hong Kong context see, for 
example, Ibid., para. 17 and Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor, ‘Shadow Report for the United Nations 
Committee against Torture on the implementation of the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the People's Republic 
of China’, submitted 18 April 2008, paras. 43-44, citing M. Daly, ‘Note on the Situation of Asylum Seekers, 
Refugees and Convention Against Torture (‘CAT’) Claimants in the Hong Kong SAR prepared for Joint 
Meeting of the Legislative Council Panels on Welfare Services and Security, 18 July 2006, LC Paper No. 
CB(2)2761/05-06(2). 
15 According to Mark Daly, one of the solicitors representing the applicants in both cases, these standards were 
raised by the applicants before the courts in Prabakar and C.  Email to the author from M. Daly, 20 March 2010 
(on file with the author). 
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This examination of the Hong Kong jurisprudence sheds light on the potential role of 
international human rights law in addressing refugee rights – the right to non-refoulement in 
particular - in a jurisdiction not bound by the Refugee Convention or Protocol.  The Hong 
Kong example could, therefore, provide valuable comparative experience for states which 
have not acceded to the Convention but have relevant international obligations and/or 
constitutionally entrenched rights.  It has particular resonance in Asia since many Asian 
countries - with some notable exceptions16 - have been unwilling to accept the protection 
obligations imposed by these instruments.17  Nevertheless, Asian practice is critical to the 
development of international refugee law.18 
Section 2 of this article reviews Hong Kong’s history as a haven for refugees in order 
to provide context for subsequent discussion and highlight its continuing influence on current 
policy approaches, public discourse, and the reasoning of the courts.  It also summarizes the 
current procedures for screening torture and refugee claimants.  Section 3 critically examines 
the judgments in Prabakar and C with reference to the sources of a right to non-refoulement 
in international law and Hong Kong law.  Section 4 concludes with some reflections on the 
implications of a human rights analysis to refugee law and policy going forward and the 
potential of other human rights standards to further the protection regime despite the 




2.1 Past refugee policy in Hong Kong 
                                                          
16 For example Cambodia, China, Fiji, Japan, Republic of Korea, and the Philippines.  As of July 2010, there 
were 147 states parties to the Refugee Convention or the 1967 Protocol or both.  See 
<http://treaties.un.org/pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx>. 
17 Some argue that Asian states have been unwilling to accept the standards promoted by the Convention partly 
because many were still under colonial rule when the Convention was originally negotiated and therefore view it 
as Eurocentric.  See S.E. Davies, ‘The Asian Rejection?: International Refugee Law in Asia’, (2006) 52 
Australian Journal of Politics and History 562-575, at 563.  
18 See J.C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 364 
(citing K. Hailbronner, ‘Non-refoulement and “Humanitarian” Refugees: Customary International Law or 
Wishful Legal Thinking?’ in D. Martin (ed.), The New Asylum Seekers: Refugee Law in the 1980s (1986), 123-
158 at 128-129).  According to the UNHCR, a large portion of the world’s refugees – approximately one third – 
‘were residing in countries in the Asia and Pacific region’ at the end of 2007.  See UNHCR, ‘2007 Global 
Trends, Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons’, June 2008, 7, 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/statistics.html. 
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Hong Kong is a society built by immigrants, including refugees, most arriving from mainland 
China during periods of political and social unrest,19 and has generally accepted asylum 
seekers, often providing settlement or temporary protection, despite its dense population and 
small geographical size.  Hong Kong has successfully integrated millions of people arriving 
from mainland China and continues to admit 150 mainland Chinese immigrants per day in 
accordance with a ‘one-way permit’ scheme.20 
More than 200,000 people arrived in Hong Kong from Vietnam seeking asylum 
between 1975 and the mid-1990s and most were either resettled in a third country or 
repatriated to Vietnam.  This period remains fresh in Hong Kong’s collective memory and the 
concerns raised during that time are still reflected in Government statements which attempt to 
justify its current policy of non-extension of the Refugee Convention.  These statements will 
be discussed in more detail in section 3. 
The first group of 3,743 Vietnamese arrived in Hong Kong on a Danish ship, the 
Clara Maersk, in May 1975.  Hong Kong became a port of first asylum and all Vietnamese 
asylum seekers were granted temporary protection and allowed to remain in Hong Kong 
pending resettlement in third countries..21  Because of increasing numbers of arrivals, and the 
growing reluctance of resettlement countries to accept all of them,22  Hong Kong announced 
in June 1988 that it would begin detaining the asylum seekers in camps and would introduce 
procedures to determine individual refugee status.23 
In the same year, the Hong Kong Government and the UNHCR concluded a 
‘Statement of Understanding Concerning the Treatment of Asylum Seekers Arriving from 
Vietnam in Hong Kong’ in which Hong Kong also affirmed that ‘all refugees will be treated 
                                                          
19 For a discussion of Chinese refugees in Hong Kong, see UNHCR, ‘State of the World’s Refugees 2000: Fifty 
Years of Humanitarian Action’, Chapter 1: The early years, 33.  The General Assembly in 1957 appealed to 
‘Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies and to non-governmental 
organizations to give all possible assistance with a view to alleviating the distress of the Chinese refugees in 
Hong Kong’ and authorized ‘the [UNHCR] to use his good offices to encourage arrangements for 
contributions’.  General Assembly Resolution 1167 XII, ‘Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong’, 26 Nov. 1957 
20See the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), ‘Arrangement for Entry to 
Hong Kong from Mainland China’, available at <http://www.immd.gov.hk>. 
21 In 1979, more than 68,700 Vietnamese asylum seekers arrived in the territory.  For an overview of the 
Vietnamese refugee era generally see UNHCR, n. 21 above, 79-105. For a summary of Hong Kong’s policy 
during this era see Hong Kong SAR Government, ‘Immigration Department Annual Report 2002-2003’, 
Chapter 4. 
22 Many of the new arrivals in the late 1980s came from northern Vietnam and resettlement countries were less 
willing to accept them as ‘genuine’ refugees.  See UNHCR, Ibid., 88. 
23 The determinations were based on art. 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention, as amended by its Protocol: A 
refugee is defined as ‘any person who … owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or 
who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence is unable or, owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it’. 
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according to established international standards and will have access to resettlement’.24  It 
further declared ‘its undertaking that the determination of refugee status will be in accordance 
with the [Refugee Convention] and [its Protocol] and UNHCR guidelines’.25  The UNHCR 
monitored the screening process and also initiated a Voluntary Repatriation Programme in 
1989.  In June 1989, Hong Kong, along with 75 other jurisdictions, signed the 
Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indo-Chinese Refugees.26 
Part IIIA of the Hong Kong Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) provided for the detention and 
screening of Vietnamese Refugees and section 13F created a Refugee Status Review Board.  
The process was open to judicial review and several cases challenging the screening 
procedures and the legality of detention went before Hong Kong courts and the Privy 
Council.27As conditions changed in Vietnam and the flow of asylum seekers subsided, Hong 
Kong ended its port of first asylum policy in January 1998 and disapplied Part IIIA of the 
Immigration Ordinance.  While the fate of individuals who had been ‘screened in’ but could 
not be resettled in a third country or had been ‘screened out’ and could not be repatriated 
                                                          
24 ‘Statement of an Understanding reached between the Hong Kong Government and UNHCR concerning 
the Treatment of Asylum Seekers arriving from Vietnam in Hong Kong’, Annexure 1 to The 
Queen v. Director of Immigration and the Refugee Status Review Board, Ex Parte Do Giau and Others 
[1992] 1 HKLR 287, para. 1. 
25 Ibid. The Hong Kong screening process nevertheless received criticism from NGOs, lawyers and other groups 
for inadequate translations during interviews, poor conditions and lack of services in the camps, and the long-
term detention of many asylum seekers who could not be resettled or returned to Vietnam. The overall success 
rate for the Vietnamese asylum seekers in the region was 28 per cent. Hong Kong had both the largest number 
of applicants (60,275) and the lowest success rate (18.8 per cent), see UNHCR, n. 20 above, 85. 
26 A number of Asian countries also signed the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) in June 1989 at the 
International Conference on Indo-Chinese Refugees in Geneva.  In this document, first asylum countries agreed 
to continue accepting Vietnamese asylum seekers and create mechanisms ‘in accordance with established 
refugee criteria and procedures’ including the Refugee Convention and its Protocol, ‘bearing in mind, to the 
extent appropriate, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international instruments 
concerning refugees’.26  This indicated a commitment to implement international standards through refugee 
status determination procedures screening Indo-Chinese asylum seekers.  While many have identified the CPA’s 
limitations and problems with its implementation, others have recommended its use as a model for resolving 
subsequent refugee situations.  For a discussion of the CPA, see, for example, S.E. Davies, ‘Realistic Yet 
Humanitarian? The Comprehensive Plan of Action and Refugee Policy in Southeast Asia’, 8 International 
Relations of the Asia Pacific (2008) 191-217 at 192; R. Towle, ‘Processes and Critiques of the Indo-Chinese 
Comprehensive Plan of Action: An Instrument of International Burden-Sharing?’ (2006) 18 IJRL 537, W.C. 
Robinson, ‘The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees, 1989–1997: Sharing the Burden and 
Passing the Buck’ (2004) 17 Journal of Refugee Studies 319; R. Mushkat, ‘Implementation of the CPA in Hong 
Kong: Does it Measure up to International Standards?’ (1993) 5 IJRL 559; S. Bari, ‘Refugee Status 
Determination under the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA): A Personal Assessment’, (1992) 4 IJRL 487 
(1992). 
27 For example, Tan Te Lam v. Tai A Chau Detention Centre [1997] AC 97 (PC) involved the detention of 
Vietnamese asylum seekers of Chinese ethnic origin who had been refused refugee status but could not be 
removed to Vietnam since the Vietnamese Government would not readmit those it did not consider Vietnamese 
nationals.  The Privy Council held that if such removal could not be accomplished within a reasonable time 
period, then further detention was unlawful.  In 1996, the Privy Council reversed a decision by the Court of 
Appeal and determined in Nguyen Tuan Cuong and Others and Director of Immigration and Others [1996] 423 
HKCU 1 that the Director of Immigration did not uphold his statutory duty under Part IIIA of the Immigration 
Ordinance by refusing to screen Vietnamese migrants who had arrived in Hong Kong from southern China. 
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remained unresolved, the Government did not initially allow the stranded Vietnamese to 
establish residency in Hong Kong.  In 2000, however, Hong Kong changed its policy, closed 
the last camps and granted residency to more than 1000 of the remaining Vietnamese.  Press 
reports at that time indicate that the Government changed its policy only after repeated, failed 
attempts to secure alternative solutions.28 
 
2.2 Current policy: parallel screening mechanisms 
 
Since the disapplication of Part IIIA of the Immigration Ordinance, Hong Kong legislation 
has not explicitly referred to refugees or other similar categories of claimants seeking 
protection from refoulement.  Despite the lack of statutory provisions, however, two separate 
but overlapping screening mechanisms have developed and operate in parallel.   
The first, established by the Hong Kong authorities in response to the CFA’s decision 
in Prabakar,29  considers claims based on article 3 of the Torture Convention.  The CFA held 
that high standards of procedural fairness are required when determining torture claims since 
fundamental human rights are at stake.30  The court identified three necessary considerations: 
(1) the torture claimant ‘should be given every reasonable opportunity’ to establish his/her 
claim that he/she would be in danger of being subjected to torture; (2) ‘[t]he claim must be 
properly assessed by the Secretary ... ’ and (3)  the Secretary for Security must give reasons 
for any rejection.31  
The procedures initially established pursuant to this judgment allowed individuals to 
lodge torture claims with the immigration authorities.  A ‘torture claimant’ would then 
receive a written explanation of the process, with interpretation where necessary, be asked to 
                                                          
28 Apparently, many of the refugees could not be resettled since they had criminal records, medical disorders or 
drug addictions.  See G. Schloss, ‘Remaining Vietnamese Boat People Set to Win Residency’, South China 
Morning Post, 9 Jan. 1999.  One member of the Legislative Council is quoted as stating that ‘he could not object 
to [the refugees] staying as the number was low and they had lived here so long’.  Other legislators, however, 
expressed concern that ‘integration of the Vietnamese would undermine stability as some had criminal records’, 
and asked the Government to explain how it would prevent the decision from attracting more ‘boat people’ to 
the territory.  See S. Lee, ‘Temporary ID for Viets to be Discussed’, South China Morning Post, 22 Feb. 2000.  
See also G. Loo, ‘Scheme Hailed, Regretted’, Hong Kong Standard, 23 Feb. 2000; M. Wong, ‘We’re happy to 
remain, say boat people’, South China Morning Post, 23 Feb. 2000; and D. Poon and G. Loo, ‘Residency offer 
to 1,400 remaining Vietnamese will last six weeks’, Hong Kong Standard, 23 Feb. 2000. 
29 n. 12 above. 
30 Ibid., para. 44. 
31 Ibid., para. 51. 
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complete a questionnaire, attend an interview with an immigration officer, and, in the event 
of a failed claim at first instance, could petition the Chief Executive of Hong Kong.32  
These procedures were challenged by way of a subsequent judicial review, FB v. 
Director of Immigration (FB),33 decided by the CFI in December 2008.  The court held that 
the mechanism failed to meet the requisite high standards of fairness set out in Prabakar and 
identified several problems including: 1) the lack of publicly funded legal assistance, 2) the 
inability of legal representatives to be present at interviews or even when the initial 
questionnaire was completed, 3) the fact that the examining officer and the decision maker 
were not the same person, 4) insufficient provision of training for decision makers – both at 
first instance and at the petition stage, and 5) lack of provision for an oral hearing on petition 
and no legal representation at that stage.34  In response, the Government temporarily ceased 
its consideration of torture claims and amended the screening procedures in an attempt to 
meet the judgment’s requirements.  The revised scheme began operating in December 2009 
according to temporary administrative ‘Guidelines for Handling Claims Made under article 3 
of the [Torture Convention]’.35  The Government has also announced plans to introduce 
relevant legislation to provide a statutory basis for the system.36 
The second, parallel mechanism is a refugee status determination procedure 
administered by the UNHCR’s Hong Kong Sub-office.  Since the disapplication of Part IIIA 
of the Immigration Ordinance and until the establishment of the torture screening procedures 
in 2004, the UNHCR provided the only avenue for individuals seeking protection from 
refoulement in Hong Kong.  The Hong Kong Government and the UNHCR have maintained 
an informal arrangement since the closure of the Vietnamese refugee camps, and Hong Kong 
has allowed asylum seekers to remain in the territory – although with no legal status - until 
                                                          
32 ‘Written replies by the Hong Kong [SAR] to the list of issues (CAT/C/HKG/Q/4) to be taken up in connection 
with the consideration of the fourth periodic report of Hong Kong (CAT/C/HKG/4)’, UN doc. 
CAT/C/HKG/Q/4/Add.1, 6 Oct. 2008, paras. 40-45.  See Basic Law art. 48(13) which sets out the Chief 
Executive’s power to handle petitions and complaints.  
33 FB v. Director of Immigration [2008] HKEC 2072 [FB]. 
34 Ibid., para. 230. 
35 Version dated 28 Dec. 2009 (on file with the author). 
36 Security Bureau (Nov. 2009), n. 5 above.  According to this document, 6,203 claims were pending at the end 
of Oct. 2009.  See also ‘Joint Position Paper by the Law Society of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Bar 
Association on the Framework for Convention against Torture Claimants and Asylum Seekers’, 31 March 2009, 
1-2;   Security Bureau, ‘Hearing of the Second Report of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region under 
the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’, for 
Discussion at the Legislative Council Panel on Security Meeting on 3 Feb. 2009, LC Paper No. CB(2)737/08-
09(03), Jan. 2009, Annex B; and A. Wong, ‘Plan to offer torture claimants legal aid in petition hearings’, South 
China Morning Post, 4 July 2009, A2. 
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the resolution of their claims.37  The Director of Immigration also permits UNHCR-
designated refugees to remain in Hong Kong pending resettlement in third countries.38  The 
UNHCR has not provided written reasons for its decisions in the past, although it is currently 
in the process of revising that policy, and has only recently begun allowing legal 
representatives to attend interviews.39  The UNHCR and the Hong Kong Government signed 
a memorandum of understanding in 2009 which increased their level of cooperation.40  The 
UNHCR has organized training sessions for immigration officers responsible for screening 
torture claims and some have been seconded to work in the UNHCR Sub-office.41 
NGOs and refugee lawyers have criticized both mechanisms for procedural 
limitations42 and have pointed out that maintaining two separate systems wastes resources 
since there is considerable overlap among claimants accessing both procedures – either 
simultaneously or one at a time.  The existence of two independent systems may even 
encourage abuse of the process – a result which the Hong Kong authorities wish to avoid – 
since claimants who avail themselves of both are generally allowed to remain in Hong Kong 
for longer periods of time.43 
                                                          
37 The UNHCR was considering 994 refugee claims as of May 2009.  Email to the author from Choosin 
Ngaotheppitak, head of the UNHCR Hong Kong Sub-office, 20 May 2009 (on file with the author).  This 
represents a significant decrease from approximately 2000 pending cases at the end of 2007.  See 2007 UNHCR 
Statistical Yearbook, 65, Table 1, <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/4981b19d2.html> .  According 
to the Hong Kong Government’s reply to the UN Committee Against Torture, n. 32 above, ‘As at end-June 
2008, there are 105 refugees, 1,671 asylum-seekers and 3,279 torture claimants remaining in Hong Kong’, para. 
56.  Most asylum seekers originate from South Asian and African countries.  The nature of the informal 
arrangement between the UNHCR and the Hong Kong Government was described in C v Director of 
Immigration which cited a letter from the UNHCR to the applicants’ solicitors: ‘UNHCR provides the HKSAR 
with the basic biographical information of each asylum seeker who approaches UNHCR.  UNHCR also 
regularly communicates the status and outcome of refugee status determination cases to the HKSAR’.  See n. 13 
above, para. 61. 
38 See n. 32 above, para. 57.  
39 Ngaotheppitak, n. 37 above. 
40 Hong Kong SAR Government, Press Release, ‘HK and UNHCR sign agreement on enhanced co-operation’, 
20 Jan. 2009. 
41 Ibid. 
42 See n. 13 above, para. 17: ‘Each of the applicants complains that the screening process conducted by the 
UNHCR is inadequate. They assert that there are often difficulties with interpretation, that the interviews are not 
ample enough, that claimants are not entitled to be legally represented and that the decisions, when made, lack 
sufficient reasoning. Perhaps the most serious complaint is that UNHCR determinations are immune from 
judicial scrutiny’.  See also Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor, ‘Shadow Report for the United Nations 
Committee against Torture on the implementation of the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the People's Republic 
of China’, 18 April 2008, para. 52, citing Joint Submission by the Society for Community Organization, Hong 
Kong Human Rights Commission, Voices of the Rights of Asylum Seekers and Refugees to the Panel on 
Welfare Services and Panel on Security, ‘Denial of Asylum Seekers’ Rights,’ LC Paper No. CB(2)2747/05-
06(03), July 2006. 
43 See ‘Government must screen torture claimants fairly’, South China Morning Post, 5 April 2009, ‘Lawyers 
raise stakes over torture cases’, South China Morning Post, 5 April 2009.  See also Law Society, n. 36 above.  In 
an editorial, the South China Morning Post advocated for ‘[a] single effective and transparent screening system’ 
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3. Prabakar and C: The Application of Non-refoulement in Hong Kong 
 
These screening mechanisms have developed in the absence of a statutory framework 
and without explicit acknowledgement by the Government or the courts that Hong Kong law 
imposes a duty of non-refoulement.  While the CFA in Prabakar merely sidestepped the issue 
- although still holding in favor of the applicant - the CFI in C denied the existence of such an 
obligation – at least with respect to ‘refugees’ as the term is understood in the Refugee 
Convention.  This section considers the courts’ reasoning in these cases and explores the 
significance of their failure to rely on a broader principle of non-refoulement which reflects 
human rights standards.  Had the court in C, for example, considered the protection from 
refoulement offered by the ICCPR, the Bill of Rights and the Basic Law, it may have reached 
a different conclusion about the consistency of non-refoulement in customary international 
law with domestic law.  If Hong Kong’s human rights commitments support such 
consistency, then the non-refoulement principle may apply in Hong Kong and require 




Sakthevel Prabakar was an ethnically Tamil asylum seeker from Sri Lanka who was 
arrested for possession of a forged Canadian passport while transiting through the Hong 
Kong airport in January 1999.  He claimed he had been tortured in Sri Lanka and was en 
route to Canada where he intended to claim asylum.  After his arrest, he lodged an application 
with the UNHCR Sub-office in Hong Kong and was eventually granted refugee status, after 
an initial rejection and a failed appeal.  The Hong Kong Government, however, refused to 
rescind a deportation order it had made against him after his conviction for possession of the 
false travel document - even after he had left Hong Kong and had resettled in Canada.44  He 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
which would be ‘fairer to claimants and better protect the city from being flooded with economic migrants’.  See 
‘Government Must Screen Torture Claimants Fairly’, South China Morning Post, 4 May 2009. 
44 See s 20(1) of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115). 
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challenged this decision as well as the Government’s reliance on the UNHCR’s unexplained 
determinations when considering claims under article 3 of the Torture Convention.   
In the judgment, the court referred to the Government’s policy of non-refoulement, 
articulated in Hong Kong’s periodic report to the UN Committee against Torture in 1999: 
Should potential removees or deportees claim that they would be subjected to torture 
in the country to which they are to be returned, the claim would be carefully assessed, 
by both the Director of Immigration and the Secretary for Security or, where the 
subject has appealed to the Chief Executive, by the Chief Executive in Council.  
Where such a claim was considered to be well founded, the subject’s return would not 
be ordered.  In considering such a claim, the Government would take into account all 
relevant considerations, including the human rights situation in the State concerned, 
as required by article 3.2 of the Convention.45 
The court noted, however, that in practice, the Government did not independently consider 
such claims, but relied solely on refugee determinations made by the UNHCR Sub-office in 
Hong Kong when deciding whether to withhold the removal or deportation of torture 
claimants. 
The court highlighted the prohibition of refoulement as the ‘central safeguard of the 
[Torture] Convention’46 and held that the Government’s approach to implementing its policy 
under article 3 did not meet the necessary high standards of procedural fairness and the 
Secretary for Security must conduct an independent assessment of the claim.  Although 
overlap may exist between refugee and torture claims, the relevant criteria considered by 
decision-makers are not identical.  While the concept of ‘persecution’ in the definition of 
‘refugee’ would certainly encompass ‘torture’,47 the Refugee Convention, unlike the Torture 
Convention, requires the establishment of a causal link between the feared persecution and 
one of the five ‘Convention grounds’ (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion).48  So a rejection by the UNHCR of an application for 
refugee status could not be relied upon as the basis for denying an article 3 claim. 
                                                          
45 China’s third periodic report under the Torture Convention, UN doc. CAT/C/39/Add.2, 4 May 1999, para. 
122, submitted pursuant to art. 19 of the Torture Convention.  Cited in Prabakar, n. 12 above, para. 19. 
46 Ibid. (Prabakar), para. 1 (per Li CJ).  At para. 44, Li CJ writes: ‘The determination of the potential deportee’s 
torture claim by the Secretary in accordance with the policy is plainly one of momentous importance to the 
individual concerned.  To him, life and limb are in jeopardy and his fundamental human right not to be 
subjected to torture is involved. Accordingly, high standards of fairness must be demanded in the making of 
such a determination’. 
47 See J.C. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991), 108-109. 
48 n. 23 above and Ibid., 135-188. 
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Despite its ruling in Prabakar’s favor and the judgment’s impact on the development 
of a torture screening mechanism, the court ultimately – and significantly – declined to 
determine whether Hong Kong has a legal duty to respect non-refoulement stating that:   
For the purposes of this appeal, the Court will assume without deciding that the 
Secretary is under a legal duty to follow the policy as a matter of domestic law. In 
proceeding on the basis of such an assumption, the Court must not be taken to be 
agreeing with the views expressed in the judgments below that such a legal duty 
exists.49 
The court below – the Court of Appeal (CA) – while seemingly recognizing the existence of 
such a duty, did not provide detailed reasoning in this regard.  It noted that the Government, 
in its report to the Committee against Torture, had referred to article 9 of the Bill of Rights 
when elaborating its non-refoulement policy.50  Article 9 essentially duplicates article 13 of 
the ICCPR and provides that: 
[a] person who does not have the right of abode in Hong Kong but is lawfully in Hong 
Kong may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in 
accordance with the law and shall, except where compelling reasons of national 
security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion to, 
and have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the purpose before, the 
competent authority or a person or persons especially designated by the competent 
authority.51   
According to the court, since the applicant was lawfully in Hong Kong until his arrest and in 
Hong Kong in accordance with the law thereafter, he was entitled to the protection afforded 
by article 9 and a proper investigation of his torture claim. 52  The judgment goes on to simply 
state that such an obligation ‘might be expressed in terms of legitimate expectation or it 
might be expressed in terms of fairness and proper application of article 9 of the Bill of 
Rights.  It matters not.  The decision was taken without the decision maker having ensured 
that the proper enquiries were made’.53  While this was enough for the court to hold in favor 
of Prabakar and set aside the deportation order, it did not firmly ground a duty of non-
refoulement in Hong Kong law.   
                                                          
49 Prabakar, n. 12 above, para. 4. 
50 Sakthevel Prabakar v Secretary for Security [2002] HKEC 1451, para. 19. 
51 Cited in ibid. 
52 Ibid., para. 22. 
53 Ibid., para. 24. 
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Both the CFA and the CA missed an opportunity in Prabakar to clarify the basis of a 
right to non-refoulement in Hong Kong law which could have provided a sounder foundation 




In C, the CFI considered two main issues: 1) whether the Hong Kong Government has an 
obligation of non-refoulement of refugees under customary international law and 2) if such an 
obligation exists then whether it imposes a duty on Hong Kong authorities to screen 
claimants for refugee status.54  The six claimants in the case were asylum seekers who had 
applied for refugee status with the UNHCR Sub-office but their claims had failed both at first 
instance and at the appeal stage.  Some had also lodged torture claims which were still 
pending at the time of the judgment. 
Hartmann J. proceeded to determine whether a rule of non-refoulement had emerged 
in customary international law and, further, whether it had achieved the status of jus cogens – 
a peremptory norm from which no derogation is permitted.55  After a review of competing 
scholarly opinion, he held that a principle of non-refoulement exists in customary 
international law but that it is not a peremptory norm56  He writes in the judgment, that ‘it 
seems to me, on balance, that today states generally do adhere to the norm and do so out of 
recognition that it creates an obligation in law’57 but that ‘it goes too far to hold - at this time 
- that the rule has acquired the status of a peremptory norm’.58 
He then considers whether the customary rule of non-refoulement forms part of Hong 
Kong law through a discussion of the ‘doctrine of incorporation’, developed by Lord Denning 
in Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria (Trendtex),59 which provides for 
the automatic incorporation of rules of international law into English law ‘unless they are in 
conflict with an Act of Parliament’.60  Citing Trendtex, Hartmann J. observes that ‘a rule of 
                                                          
54 See n. 13 above, para. 1. 
55 A peremptory norm, or jus cogens, is ‘accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a 
whole as [a] norm from which no derogation is permitted’.  The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, art. 53. 
56 n. 13 above., paras. 115 and 135.  
57 Ibid., para. 115. 
58 Ibid., para. 135. 
59 [1977] 1 QB 529. 
60 See n. 13 above, para. 80.  For a discussion and critique of the doctrine of incorporation in the Hong Kong 
context, see O. Jones, ‘Customary Non-refoulement of Refugees and Automatic Incorporation into the Common 
Law: A Hong Kong Perspective’ (2009) 58 ICLQ 443 at 457. Jones argues that Trendtex should not have 
survived the change of sovereignty in 1997 since the Basic Law provides for a clear separation of powers and 
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customary international law cannot displace a domestic law.  If it is in conflict with domestic 
law then it will not be received into our law’.61  He notes that the test is one of consistency,62 
and seems to accept that a more stringent test would apply when human rights are at stake.63  
Ultimately he decides, however, that non-refoulement has not been incorporated into Hong 
Kong law and seems to apply either (or both) a test of consistency or evidence that Hong 
Kong has ‘contracted out’ of – and therefore repudiated – the rule.   He reasons that a lack of 
domestic legislation providing protection for refugees indicates that Hong Kong’s laws are 
contrary to the rule and that Hong Kong has ‘by consistent and long-standing objection … 
refused to accede to the rule’.64  The latter argument appears to reflect the concept of 
persistent objection in international law.65 
According to the judgment, three factors in particular demonstrated such 
inconsistency – or repudiation of the rule - including: 1) the Hong Kong Government’s 
explicit rejection of the Refugee Convention; 2) a general reservation to the ICCPR for 
immigration legislation; and 3) the limited, temporary nature of a refugee regime 
implemented in the 1980s and 1990s designed only to deal with an influx of asylum seekers 
from Vietnam.66   
In reaching this determination, Hartmann J. appears to incorrectly conflate an 
obligation of non-refoulement with the Refugee Convention as a whole and also seems to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the doctrine of incorporation involves judicial lawmaking.  He does not consider in detail the implications of a 
constitutional right to non-refoulement in his analysis, however. 
61 See n. 13 above, para. 82. 
62 Ibid., para. 83, citing Chung Chi Cheung v. R. [1939] AC160 at 168. 
63 Ibid., para. 84, citing R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Phansopkar [1976] 1 QB 606 
at 626: ‘… in my judgment it is the duty of the courts, so long as they do not defy or disregard clear unequivocal 
provision, to construe statutes in a manner which promotes, not endangers, those rights.  Problems of ambiguity 
or omission, if they arise under the language of an Act, should be resolved so as to give effect to, or at the very 
least so as not to derogate from the rights …’ 
64 Ibid. (C), para. 194(iii). 
65 The concept of the persistent objector, although widely accepted, is controversial, especially in the human 
rights context.  Cassese claims that ‘there is no firm support in State practice and international case law for a 
rule on the “persistent objector”’.   See A. Cassese, International Law (OUP, 2nd edn., 2005), 163.  See also J. 
Wouters and C. Ryngaert, ‘Impact on the Process of the Formation of Customary International Law’, in M.T. 
Kamminga and M. Scheinin (eds.), The Impact of Human Rights Law on General International Law (OUP, 
2009), at 130-131; H. Lau, ‘Rethinking the Persistent Objector Doctrine in International Human Rights Law’ 
(2005) 6 CJIL 495; T.L. Stein, ‘The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent 
Objector in International Law’ (1985) 26 HILJ 457; D.A. Colson, ‘How Persistent must the Persistent Objector 
Be?’ (1986) 61 WLR 957; T. Meron, The Humanization of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2006), 374-376; J.I. Charney, ‘The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International 
Law’ (1985) 56 BYIL 1 (1985). 
66 n. 13 above, para. 89.  Hartmann J. sets out the factors considered by the Court of Appeal in Madam Lee Bun 
and Another v. Director of Immigration [1990] 2 HKLR 466.  He states that he is satisfied that the judgment in 
that case is binding on him (para. 92). 
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confuse non-refoulement with the concept of asylum.67  This distinction is critical for 
understanding the implications of the Convention’s non-applicability to Hong Kong since a 
rejection of the Convention does not necessarily imply a rejection of non-refoulement.  
Failure to implement full protections for all refugees similarly may not be demonstrative of a 
repudiation of non-refoulement.  In addition, Hartmann J. does not explore in any depth the 
broader non-refoulement principle – reflected in international law and Hong Kong 
constitutional law - which goes beyond the more limited articulation found in article 33 of the 
Refugee Convention,68 and which is clearly consistent with Hong Kong law.  A more detailed 
analysis of Hong Kong’s human rights commitments is also likely to demonstrate consistency 
with the narrower principle of non-refoulement of refugees facing potential persecution on 
one of the five Refugee Convention grounds – since the term ‘persecution’ is generally 
defined with reference to serious human rights violations.69 
 
   
 
3.2.1 Non-refoulement in international and comparative law 
Before developing these arguments in greater detail below, the next two sections will first 
review the international and domestic sources of a right to non-refoulement in order to 
provide a basis for understanding these gaps in the judgment. 
 The principle of non-refoulement of refugees is well-established in international law.  
In addition to article 33 of the Refugee Convention, a number of other international and 
regional instruments – of both a binding and non-binding character - contain explicit 
                                                          
67 For a discussion of the difference between asylum and non-refoulement, see Hathaway, The Rights of 
Refugees in International Law (2005), 300-301. 
68 Art. 33(1) provides that ‘No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’.  Art. 33(2) limits the benefit 
of the provision which is not available to ‘a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a 
danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a 
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country’.  The applicants’ solicitor 
confirmed that this point was raised by the applicants before the court – but was not picked up in the judgment.  
See, above n. 15.  
69 M. Foster, International Refugee Law and Socio-Economic Rights: Refuge from Deprivation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 27.  Foster cites Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International 
Law, 193, who refers to Vernant’s suggestion in 1953 that persecution should be equated ‘with severe sanctions 
and measures of an arbitrary nature, incompatible with the principles set forth in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights’.  She credits Hathaway’s proposition that persecution be defined as ‘a sustained or systemic 
violation of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of state protection’ for the expansion of a human 
rights approach.  See Hathaway (1991) above n. 47, 104-5.  She also cites a number of domestic judgments, 
UNHCR documents, and scholarly commentaries which support a human rights interpretation. (See Foster, 27-
33) 
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prohibitions of refoulement.70  These include the 1969 Organization of Africa Unity 
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,71 the 1984 
Cartagena Declaration,72 and the Bangkok Principles.73  In addition, some instruments 
provide for complementary, or subsidiary, protection from refoulement for persons who may 
face serious harm if expelled, but may not fall within the definition of refugee in the Refugee 
Convention and Protocol.  These include the Torture Convention,74 the 1969 American 
Convention on Human Rights (article 22(8)), 75 and the 2004 European Union Qualification 
Directive.76  Although opinion varies, scholars generally agree that the principle of non-
refoulement has become a rule of customary international law binding on all States regardless 
                                                          
70 See generally, J. McAdam, Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2007); G.S. Goodwin-Gill and J. McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford University Press, 
2007), 285-354; A. Duffy, ‘Expulsion to Face Torture? Non-refoulement in International Law’ (2008) 20 IJRL 
373-390; D. Weissbrodt and I. Hörtreiter, ‘The Principle of Non-refoulement: Art. 3 of the Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Comparison with the Non-
refoulement Provisions of Other International Human Rights Treaties’ (1999) 5 BHRLR 1-73. 
71 Art. 2(3): ‘No person shall be subjected by a Member State to measures such as rejection at the frontier, return 
or expulsion, which would compel him to return to or remain in a territory where his life, physical integrity or 
liberty would be threatened for the reasons of [race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion] or [external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing 
public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality]’. 
72 Section III, para. 5: ‘The colloquium adopted the following conclusions … To reiterate the importance and 
meaning of the principle of non-refoulement (including the prohibition of rejection at the frontier) as a corner-
stone of the international protection of refugees. This principle is imperative in regard to refugees and in the 
present state of international law should be acknowledged and observed as a rule of jus cogens’.  
73 Art. III: ‘No one seeking asylum in accordance with these Principles shall be subjected to measures such as 
rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion which would result in his life or freedom being threatened on 
account of his race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion’. 
74 Art. 3(1).  For a comprehensive discussion of this obligation see M. Nowak and E. McArthur, The United 
Nations Convention Against Torture (OUP, 2008), 126-228; J. McAdam, n. 70 above, 111-135; and Goodwin-
Gill and McAdam, n. 70 above, 301-305.  Under art. 3 the claimant must demonstrate he/she is ‘in danger of’ 
being subjected to torture. The CAT Committee has commented that it would be necessary to establish that a 
return to torture ‘would have the foreseeable and necessary consequence of exposing [an individual] to a real 
risk of being … tortured’. (See Mutombo v. Switzerland, Communication No. 13/1993, U.N. doc. A/49/44 at 45 
(1994), para. 9.4.  The Committee has issued decisions on 136 communications involving art. 3 and Nowak 
McArthur observe that these represent ‘[t]he vast majority of individual complaints decided by the CAT 
Committee’, Nowak and McArthur, 127). 
75 ‘In no case may an alien be deported or returned to a country, regardless of whether or not it is his country of 
origin, if in that country his right to life or personal freedom is in danger of being violated because of his race, 
nationality, religion, social status, or political opinions’. 
76 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third 
country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and 
the content of the protection granted.  Subsidiary protection applies to ‘a third country national or a stateless 
person who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for 
believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin … would face a real risk of 
suffering serious harm … and is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the 
protection of that country.  Art. 15 provides that “serious harm” consists of death penalty or execution, torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; or serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by 
reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict’.  For a discussion of 
subsidiary protection in the Council Directive, see R. Piotrowicz and van Eck, ‘Subsidiary Protection and 
Primary Rights’ (2004) 53 ICLQ 107 and McAdam, n. 70 above, 60-84.   
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of treaty obligations77 and, although originally derived from article 33 of the Refugee 
Convention, now goes beyond the confines of this provision and reflects developments in 
human rights law.  Lauterpacht and Bethlehem’s authoritative review of non-refoulement in 
customary international law – which Hartmann J. cites favorably in C - concludes that the 
principle requires that ‘[n]o person seeking asylum may be rejected, returned, or expelled in 
any manner whatever where this would compel him or her to remain in or to return to a 
territory where he or she may face a threat of persecution or to life, physical integrity, or 
liberty’.78  Also,  
No person shall be rejected, returned, or expelled in any manner whatever where this 
would compel him or her to remain in or return to a territory where substantial 
grounds can be shown for believing that he or she would face a real risk of being 
subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.79  
In addition to these explicit obligations, the Human Rights Committee, the body which 
monitors the implementation of the ICCPR, and the European Court of Human Rights have 
interpreted an implicit right to non-refoulement in the ICCPR and the European Convention 
on Human Rights respectively.80 
                                                          
77 Principles of customary international law arise from consistent state practice and opinio juris (the belief that 
the practice is compulsory).  For a detailed explanation of the sources and content of the principle of non-
refoulement at customary international law, see Sir Elihu Lauterpacht and Daniel Bethlehem, ‘The Scope and 
Content of the Principle of Non-refoulement’, 20 June 2001, 61-87, available at <http://www.unhcr.ch>. See 
also G.S. Goodwin Gill, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 117-171.  A 
minority of scholars, including Hathaway, dispute the existence of a customary rule.  See JC Hathaway, The 
Rights of Refugees under International Law (2005), 363-367.  See Discussion of customary international law in 
M. Dixon and R. McCorquodale, Cases and Materials on International Law (OUP, 2003), 28-37.   
78 Ibid. (Lauterpacht and Bethlehem), para. 253(b).  Also cited in, n. 13 above, para. 103.  Exceptions may be 
possible in light of ‘overriding considerations of national security or public safety’ but only in circumstances ‘in 
which the threat does not equate to and would not be regarded as being on a par with a danger of torture or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and would not come within the scope of other non-
derogable customary principles of human rights’ (para. 253(c)).   
79 Ibid. (Lauterpacht and Bethlehem), para. 253(a).  They also observe that ‘[t]his principle allows of no 
limitation or exception’. 
80 Art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights prohibits torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.  A number of cases have established that this includes an implicit obligation of non-refoulement 
including, for example, Soering v. United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439, Chahal v. UK (1996) 23 EHRR 413, 
and Garabayev v. Russia [2007] ECHR 38411/02.  In Soldatenko v. Ukraine [2008] ECHR 2440/07, the ECHR 
held that ‘[i]t is the settled case law of the Court that extradition by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue 
under art. 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds 
have been shown for believing that the person in question would, if extradited, face a real risk of being subjected 
to treatment contrary to art. 3 in the receiving country. The establishment of such responsibility inevitably 
involves an assessment of conditions in the requesting country against the standards of art. 3 of the Convention.  
Nonetheless, there is no question of adjudicating on or establishing the responsibility of the receiving country, 
whether under general international law, under the Convention or otherwise.  In so far as any liability under the 
Convention is or may be incurred, it is liability incurred by the extraditing Contracting State by reason of its 
having taken action which has as a direct consequence the exposure of an individual to proscribed ill-treatment’ 
(at para.  66). See also paras. 67-69 of Soldatenko for an elaboration of other general principles the court has 
developed when considering states’ non-refoulement obligations under art. 3.  For further discussion see, for 
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In its jurisprudence and General Comments, the Human Rights Committee has 
expounded on the obligation of states parties to the ICCPR to refrain from returning a person 
to a place where he/she would be exposed to a real risk of a violation of rights under the 
Covenant.81  Articles 6 (the right to life) and 7 (the right not to be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) are particularly relevant.   
Article 6(1) provides that ‘[e]very human being has the inherent right to life. This 
right shall be protected by law.  No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life’.  The 
Committee notes that this is ‘the supreme right from which no derogation is permitted even in 
time of public emergency’,82 that it should not be interpreted narrowly, and that it requires 
positive action to ensure protection.83  The Committee considered the implicit right to non-
refoulement contained in article 6 in A.R.J. v. Australia, an individual communication 
brought under the first Optional Protocol to the ICCPR by an Iranian national who had been 
convicted of a drug charge in Australia.  Mr J. argued that he would be executed or tortured if 
returned to Iran and therefore deportation by Australia would violate his right to life.  The 
Committee found no violation, based on evidence indicating that Iran would not impose the 
death penalty for the relevant offence and there was no outstanding warrant for A.R.J.’s 
arrest.  It stated, however, that if he had been ‘exposed to a real risk of a violation of article 6, 
paragraph 2 [concerning the death penalty] in Iran, this would entail a violation by Australia 
of its obligations under article 6, paragraph 1’.84  It asserted that ‘[i]f a State party deports a 
person within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction in such circumstances that as a result, 
there is a real risk that his or her rights under the Covenant will be violated in another 
jurisdiction, that State party itself may be in violation of the Covenant’.85  The Committee 
further explained that  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
example, Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, n. 70 above, 311-323.  Hathaway, citing R (Ullah) v. Special 
Adjudicator; Do v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 26 (UK HL, June 17, 2004), 
notes that ‘there is nascent support for the view that states parties to the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms will not be allowed to remove persons who face the risk of a particularly serious 
violation of a fairly wide range of human rights’.  See Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees (2005), 369. 
81 A.J.R. n. 9 above.  McAdam notes the HRC’s tacit acceptance ‘that removing an individual to face a real risk 
of violation of any ICCPR right could constitute refoulement’ (See Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, n. 70 above, 
308). 
82 Human Rights Committee General Comment 6, para. 1 and General Comment 14, para. 1  
83 Ibid. (General Comment 6), paras. 1 and 5. 
84 A.R.J. n. 9 above, para. 6.11.  Art. 6(2) provides that ‘[i]n countries which have not abolished the death 
penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force 
at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out 
pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court’. 
85 Ibid., para. 6.9. 
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States parties to the Covenant must ensure that they carry out all their other legal 
commitments, whether under domestic law or under agreements with other states, in a 
manner consistent with the Covenant.  Relevant for the consideration of this issue is 
the State party's obligation, under article 2, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, to ensure to 
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized 
in the Covenant. The right to life is the most fundamental of these rights.86   
Similarly, according to its General Comment on the general legal obligation imposed on 
states under article 2, the Committee considers that the duty to  
respect and ensure the Covenant rights for all persons in their territory and all persons 
under their control entails an obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise 
remove a person from their territory where there are substantial grounds for believing 
that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 
7 of the Covenant, either in the country to which removal is to be effected or in any 
country to which the person may subsequently be removed.  The relevant judicial and 
administrative authorities should be made aware of the need to ensure compliance 
with the Covenant obligations in such matters.87      
Article 7 of the ICCPR provides that ‘[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.  The Committee’s General Comment 20 
indicates that ‘States parties must not expose individuals to the danger of torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another country by way of 
their extradition, expulsion or refoulement’ and that ‘States parties should indicate in their 
reports what measures they have adopted to that end.’88    
Unlike the explicit non-refoulement obligation in article 3 of the Torture Convention, 
the implicit duty in article 7 goes beyond avoiding a return to torture and also includes non-
refoulement to face cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.  The Committee 
has also remarked on the need for fairness when determining who may be subject to such a 
risk observing ‘that where one of the highest values protected by the Covenant, namely the 
right to be free from torture, is at stake, the closest scrutiny should be applied to the fairness 
of the procedure applied to determine whether an individual is at a substantial risk of 
torture’.89 
                                                          
86 Ibid., para. 6.8.  See also G.T. v. Australia (706/1996), UN doc. CCPR/C/61/D/706/1996, paras. 8.1 and 8.2. 
87 General Comment 31, n 9 above. 
88 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, 1992, para. 9. 
89 Ahani v. Canada (1051/2002), para. 10.6. 
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Significantly, considerable overlap exists between the explicit and implicit rights to 
non-refoulement in the Torture Convention and the ICCPR and the duty of non-refoulement 
of refugees in article 33 of the Refugee Convention which prohibits refoulement to the 
frontiers of territories where an individual’s ‘life or freedom would be threatened on account 
of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’.  
Article 33 is generally understood to apply to ‘refugees’90 a term which includes the concept 
of ‘persecution’.91  Although there is no clear definition of persecution in international law,92 
it has been increasingly interpreted with reference to violations of internationally recognized 
human rights.  Foster observes that  
[o]ne of the most significant developments in refugee law jurisprudence in recent 
years has been the well-documented move towards an understanding of ‘being 
persecuted’, as well as other elements of the definition [of refugee], that is informed 
and understood in the context of international human rights standards.93   
This close connection between the protection of refugees and those claiming a right to non-
refoulement to states where they may face violations of rights in the ICCPR is underscored by 
the Committee’s frequent comments on refugee laws and policies in its concluding 
observations on states parties’ reports.94  With respect to non-refoulement, international 
human rights standards arguably provide broader protection than article 33 since they do not 
require proof that the harm feared is based on any of the Refugee Convention grounds (race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion).  If an 
individual faces potential persecution, the implicit and explicit rights to non-refoulement in 
the ICCPR and the Torture Convention would likely provide protection for a significant 
proportion of individuals falling within the definition of ‘refugee’ in the Refugee Convention. 
Courts in some domestic jurisdictions have drawn on the Torture Convention, the 
ICCPR and the Human Rights Committee’s interpretive materials when deliberating on the 
existence of a right to non-refoulement in their constitutional documents.  In Suresh v. 
                                                          
90 n. 23 above.  ‘[Any person who] owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country’.  
91 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, n. 70 above, 232. 
92 UNHCR, ‘Handbook on procedures and criteria for determining refugee status under the 1951 Convention 
and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees’ (Geneva, 1979, re-edited 1992), HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1; J. 
Pirjola, ‘Shadows in Paradise – Exploring Non-refoulement as an Open Concept’ (2007) 19 IJRL 639-660 at 
645. 
93 See, Foster, above n. 69; and Hathaway above n. 47, as cited by Foster in above n. 69. 
94 See, for example, Concluding Comments on Spain’s Report, UN doc. CCPR/C/ESP/CO/5, 
5 Jan. 2009, para. 16; Concluding Comments on Japan’s report, UN doc. CCPR/C/JPN/CO/5, 18 Dec. 2008, 
para. 25; Concluding Comments on Denmark’s report, UN doc. CCPR/C/DNK/CO/5, 16 Dec. 2008, para. 10; 
Concluding Observations on France’s report, UN doc. CCPR/C/FRA/CO/4, 31 July 2008, para. 20. 
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Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),95 the Canadian Supreme Court refers to 
both article 3 of the Torture Convention and article 7 of the ICCPR and notes that: ‘[w]hile 
the provisions of the ICCPR do not themselves specifically address the permissibility of a 
state’s expelling a person to face torture elsewhere, General Comment No. 20 to the ICCPR 
makes clear that Art. 7 is intended to cover that scenario ... ’.96  The court adds that ‘the 
prohibition in the ICCPR and the CAT on returning a refugee to face a risk of torture reflects 
the prevailing international norm’.97   
In Attorney General v. Ahmed Zaoui (Zaoui),98 the New Zealand Supreme Court 
considered provisions prohibiting torture and the arbitrary deprivation of life in its Bill of 
Rights, which are similar to their counterparts in the ICCPR, noting that: 
[t]hose provisions do not expressly apply to actions taken outside New Zealand by 
other governments in breach of the rights stated in the Bill of Rights.  That is also the 
case with articles 6(1) and 7 of the ICCPR.  But those and comparable provisions 
have long been understood as applying to actions of a state party – here New Zealand 
– if that state proposes to take action, say by way of deportation or extradition, where 
substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person as a consequence 
faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or the arbitrary taking of life.99  The 
focus is not on the responsibility of the state to which the person may be sent.  Rather, 
it is on the obligation of the state considering whether to remove the person to respect 
the substantive rights in issue.100 
                                                          
95 2002 SCC 1.  For a discussion of this case, see O.C. Okafor and P.L. Okoronkwo, ‘Re-configuring Non-
refoulement?  The Suresh Decision, “Security Relativism”, and the International Human Rights Imperative’ 
(2003) 15 IJRL 30-67.   
96 Ibid. (Suresh), para. 66. 
97 Ibid., para. 72.   Although finding that ‘torture is so abhorrent that it will almost always be disproportionate to 
interests on the other side of the balance, even security interests’, the court held that deportation to torture may 
be possible in ‘exceptional circumstances’ (see paras. 76 and 129).   The Committee against Torture criticized 
this position in its concluding comments on Canada’s report in 2005: ‘The Committee expresses its concern at: 
(a) The failure of the Supreme Court of Canada, in Suresh v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, to 
recognize at the level of domestic law the absolute nature of the protection of art. 3 of the Convention, which is 
not subject to any exception whatsoever’.  See UN doc. CAT/C/CR/34/CAN, 7 July 2005, para. 4(a).  Similarly 
the Human Rights Committee expressed concern over Canada’s ‘policy that, in exceptional circumstances, 
persons can be deported to a country where they would face the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, which amounts to a grave breach of art. 7 of the Covenant’ and stated that Canada ‘should recognize 
the absolute nature of the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, which in no 
circumstances can be derogated from’.  See CCPR/C/CAN/CO/5, 20 April 2006, para. 15.  
98 [2005] NZSC 38. 
99 Ibid.  The court cited Soering, above n. 80, paras 90 and 91, Kindler v. Canada (1993) Human Rights 
Committee, UN doc. CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991, paras 13.1-13.2, R (Ullah) v. Special Adjudicator [2003] 1 WLR 
770 (CA), Chalal, above n. 80, paras. 73-82.  See also for extradition the powers of the Minister of Justice in 
ss 30(2)(b), 48(1)(b) and 49 of the Extradition Act 1999. 
100 Ibid. (Zaoui), para. 79.  The court noted that the New Zealand Government accepted that the obligations with 
respect to torture and arbitrary deprivation of life were absolute (contrary to the Canadian approach in Suresh).  
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This approach is reflected in immigration laws in a number of jurisdictions.  For example, the 
Canadian Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001, defines a ‘person in need of 
protection’ as ‘a person in Canada whose removal … would subject them personally to a 
danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the meaning of article 1 of 
the Convention Against Torture; or to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual 
treatment or punishment’.101  The New Zealand Immigration Act 2009 reforms New 
Zealand’s status determination procedures to allow claims for protection based on the Torture 
Convention and the ICCPR in addition to refugee status applications.102 
 
3.2.2 Non-refoulement in Hong Kong law 
 
Hong Kong constitutional law arguably contains an implicit right to non-refoulement which 
reflects the provisions in international human rights instruments and the broad principle in 
customary international law discussed above.  Its content includes, at least, non-refoulement 
to torture, cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment and violations of other 
fundamental rights – especially those which are non-derogable103 - including the arbitrary 
deprivation of life. 
 The Hong Kong Bill of Rights essentially duplicates the provisions in the ICCPR, 
including articles 6 and 7104 and the Basic Law contains a similar expression of relevant 
rights in article 28.   Together, these documents provide for an implicit constitutional right to 
non-refoulement.105  Indeed, the extent of Hong Kong’s international human rights 
commitments and their incorporation in domestic law signals Hong Kong’s acceptance of the 
broader non-refoulement norm in customary international law discussed above. 
The ICCPR has constitutional significance in Hong Kong since article 39 of the Basic Law 
provides for its entrenchment: ‘[t]he provisions of the [ICCPR], the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and international labour conventions as applied to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
For a discussion of this case, see R. Haines, ‘National Security and Non-refoulement in New Zealand: 
Commentary on Zaoui v Attorney-General (No 2)’ in McAdam (ed), Forced Migration, Human Rights and 
Security (Hart Publishing, 2008), 63-91. 
101 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 97. 
102 ss 130 and 131. 
103 Art. 4(1) of the ICCPR allows states to derogate from many of the rights in the Covenant in public 
emergencies which threaten the life of the nation.  No derogation may be made to certain rights, however, listed 
in art. 4(2). 
104 Arts. 2 and 3 of Part II of the Bill of Rights Ordinance. 
105 See K. Loper, ‘Toward Comprehensive Refugee Legislation in Hong Kong’?  Reflections on Reform of the 
“Torture Screening” Procedures’, (2009) 39 HKLJ 253-9. 
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Hong Kong shall remain in force and shall be implemented through the laws of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region’.  Young notes that the Basic Law is not the ‘exclusive 
source of constitutional rights’ in Hong Kong since it ‘engrafts the rights and freedoms in the 
ICCPR … onto itself according to the terms of article 39’.106 
In addition, article 28 of the Basic Law arguably creates a stand-alone implicit right to 
non-refoulement by providing for the inviolability of the freedom of the person and 
prohibiting arbitrary or unlawful arrest, detention or imprisonment, arbitrary or unlawful 
search of the body, deprivation or restriction of the freedom of the person, torture, and 
arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life.107  Therefore, the combination of articles 28 and 39 
of the Basic Law, coupled with articles 2 and 3 of the Bill of Rights and principles of 
customary international law, elaborate the content of non-refoulement in Hong Kong law. 
Hong Kong courts have interpreted fundamental rights in Hong Kong robustly and the 
judiciary has played an active role in the protection of rights.108  In the landmark case of Ng 
Ka Ling and Others v. Director of Immigration in 1999, the CFA confirmed the constitutional 
nature of the Basic Law and the courts’ jurisdiction to determine the compatibility of 
legislation and executive acts with the Basic Law, concluding that ‘laws which are 
inconsistent with the Basic Law are of no effect and are invalid’.109  The court held that ‘the 
exercise of this jurisdiction is a matter of obligation, not of discretion so that if inconsistency 
is established, the courts are bound to hold that a law or executive act is invalid at least to the 
extent of the inconsistency’.110  The implementation of policies and laws must therefore be 
consistent with constitutional rights including non-refoulement. 
Section 11 of the Bill of Rights, however, incorporates a broad reservation to the 
ICCPR - made by the British on behalf of Hong Kong and extended by China after 1997 - 
                                                          
106 S.N.M. Young, ‘Restricting Basic Law Rights in Hong Kong’, (2004) 34 HKLJ 109-132 at 110.  Young 
describes this as a ‘complex legal matrix of overlapping constitutional rights both in and outside the Basic Law’. 
107 At first glance, the application of this article appears limited to Hong Kong residents, but Basic Law art. 41 
provides that ‘[p]ersons in the Hong Kong [SAR] other than Hong Kong residents shall, in accordance with law, 
enjoy the rights and freedoms of Hong Kong residents prescribed in this chapter’.  Although vague, this 
formulation seems to indicate that non-residents have the same rights as residents unless these rights are 
restricted by law.  Arguably, non-derogable rights, such as many of the rights enumerated in art. 28, have not 
been limited by law for non-residents.  This interpretation is consistent with Hong Kong’s obligation under the 
ICCPR to ‘ensure the rights set forth in the Covenant to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction’ (art. 2(1)).  See Human Rights Committee, General Comment 15: The Position of Aliens under the 
Covenant, 1986, and General Comment 31, para. 10. 
108 See generally Chan (2007), n. 11 above. 
109 (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4. 
110 Ibid., para. 61. 
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which essentially exempts immigration legislation from constitutional challenge.111  
Although Hong Kong courts have upheld the legitimacy of this exception in several cases,112 
these have involved rights – such as protections for the family - which do not reflect rules of 
customary international law, peremptory norms, or non-derogable rights.113  In one such case, 
Chan To Foon & Others v The Director of Immigration and the Secretary for Security, the 
court acknowledged this distinction with regard to peremptory norms: 
… what must be remembered in respect of immigration matters is that Hong 
Kong’s reservations to the three conventions (and the exception to the Bill of 
Rights) do not offend peremptory norms.  No reservation is made similar to a 
right to reserve child labour or torture …114 
The limits of section 11 are further delineated by a General Comment issued by the Human 
Rights Committee.115  The Committee does not accept the validity of reservations to 
provisions in the ICCPR ‘that represent customary international law (and a fortiori when they 
have the character of peremptory norms)’.  As a result, ‘a State may not reserve the right to 
engage in slavery, to torture, to subject persons to cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, to arbitrarily deprive persons of their lives, to arbitrarily arrest and detain 
persons’.116  The Human Rights Committee further notes that ‘…the normal consequences of 
an unacceptable reservation will generally be severable, in the sense that the Covenant will be 
operative for the reserving party without benefit of the reservation’.117 
The CFI cited this General Comment favorably in Ubamaka Edward Wilson v. 
Secretary for Security (Ubamaka), a case decided in May 2009.118  In Ubamaka, the 
applicant argued that he was at risk of double jeopardy, amounting to cruel inhuman or 
degrading treatment, if the Hong Kong authorities deported him to Nigeria.  He feared that he 
                                                          
111 ‘As regards persons not having the right to enter and remain in Hong Kong, this Ordinance does not affect 
any immigration legislation governing entry into, stay in and departure from Hong Kong, or the application of 
any such legislation’. 
112 See for example Mok Chi Hung v. Director of Immigration [2001] 1 HKC 281; Chan To Foon & Others v. 
The Director of Immigration and the Secretary for Security [2001] HKCU 1; and Chan Mei Yee v. Director of 
Immigration [2000] HKEC 788. 
113 Art. 23(1) of the ICCPR, which provides that ‘The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of 
society and is entitled to protection by society and the State’, is not listed as one of the non-derogable rights in 
art. 4(2) of the Covenant.  Art. 10(1) of the ICESCR provides that the ‘widest possible protection and assistance 
should be accorded to the family, which is the fundamental group unit of society’. 
114 See n. 112 above (Chan To Foon).  In Ng Ka Ling the provision in question related to categories of 
permanent residents. 
115 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24 ‘Issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or 
accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under art. 41 of the 
Covenant’, UN doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, 1994. 
116 Ibid., para. 8. 
117 Ibid., para. 18. 
118 [2009] HKEC 710. 
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could face conviction in Nigeria for a drug-related offence for which he had already served a 
long prison term in Hong Kong.  In the judgment, Reyes J. noted that government counsel  
properly accepts that the reservation to the application of the [Hong Kong Bill of 
Rights] and ICCPR in relation to immigration legislation do not apply where [Bill of 
Rights] [article] 3 and ICCPR [article] 7 are concerned.  This is because the injunction 
against inflicting torture or other forms of inhuman or degrading treatment are 
peremptory norms of customary international law.  It is not possible for a state to 
derogate from those norms.119   
Reyes J. quashed the deportation order on the basis that ‘in all the circumstances, to deport 
Mr. Ubamaka at some point in the future to face the real risk of re-trial in Nigeria would, I 
think, be a cruel blow, amounting to inhuman treatment of a severity proscribed by the [Bill 
of Rights], the ICCPR and [the Torture Convention]’.120 
 Accordingly, although applicable in many immigration-related situations, the 
reservation – and the corresponding exception in the Bill of Rights – would not apply to the 
implicit right to non-refoulement discussed above.  This is true since the rights involved - 
freedom from torture and arbitrary deprivation of life – are non-derogable and arguably 
peremptory norms.  Even if they are not peremptory norms – and even if Hartmann J. is 
correct in C that a rule of non-refoulement has not achieved the status of jus cogens – the 
Human Rights Committee’s General Comment on treaty reservations would still apply to 
rules of customary international law.  Therefore, where the deportation or removal of an 
individual would likely result in serious violations of his/her human rights, the Director of 
Immigration must exercise his general discretion – provided by the Immigration Ordinance121 
- consistently with a constitutional right to non-refoulement.  In any event, article 28 of the 
Basic Law likely serves as an autonomous right reflecting similar content without the impact 
of the ICCPR immigration reservation and similar Bill of Rights exception.122 
Hong Kong’s human rights obligations are therefore relevant to the protection of 
refugees because they require non-refoulement in a broader range of circumstances than 
currently considered in the torture screening procedures based on article 3 of the Torture 
Convention.  While claimants in Hong Kong seeking protection from refoulement to serious 
violations of human rights in articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR may not overlap entirely with 
Refugee Convention ‘refugees’, such claims would encompass a wide range of similar 
                                                          
119 Ibid., para. 94. 
120 Ibid., para. 111. 
121 Cap. 115, ss. 11 and 13. 
122 See Young, n. 106 above, 111. 
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refugee-like situations.  The differences between the definitions of ‘refugee’, ‘torture 
claimant’, and other categories of persons who would qualify for protection from refoulement 
under these broader standards, begin to break down in the face of this analysis.  Protection 
through government-sponsored screening procedures, however, has not been expanded to 
cover these other categories of claimants. 
 
3.2.3 Constitutional Rights, Consistency and Incorporation of Non-refoulement 
 
In C, Hartmann J. does not consider the implicit constitutional rights discussed above, 
although he cites Lauterpacht and Bethlehem’s discussion of a broader non-refoulement 
principle in customary international law.123  In his view their analysis commands ‘particular 
authority’.124  As noted above, their formulation of the principle’s content goes beyond the 
non-refoulement of refugees, as defined in the Refugee Convention, and incorporates 
developments in general human rights law.125  They also observe that the implementation of 
the principle of non-refoulement into domestic legislation provides evidence of state practice 
and opinio juris.126  Thus Hong Kong’s entrenchment of the ICCPR into domestic law 
contributes to this process and, at the same time, demonstrates consistency with the principle.  
At the very least, it undermines any argument that Hong Kong law is inconsistent with non-
refoulement. 
Hartmann J. also favorably cites a document produced by a roundtable of experts in 
2001 which expressed a consensus that refugee law is dynamic and ‘informed by the broad 
object and purpose of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol, as well as by 
developments in related areas of international law, such as human rights law and international 
humanitarian law’.127  Nevertheless he ultimately fails to acknowledge the significance of the 
breadth of the non-refoulement principle – and its reflection of rights entrenched in Hong 
Kong’s constitution - for determining whether it had been incorporated into Hong Kong law. 
When considering the issues of consistency and incorporation, Hartmann J. relied 
heavily on Madam Lee Bun and Another v. Director of Immigration, a case decided by the 
CA in 1990 which he believed was binding.128  The applicants were asylum seekers from 
                                                          
123 See n. 13 above, para. 103. 
124 Ibid. 
125 See n. 77 above (Lauterpacht and Bethlehem). 
126 Ibid., 148, para. 213. 
127 See n. 13 above, para. 104. 
128 Ibid., paras. 85-93 and 138-143. 
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mainland China alleging that they were political refugees.  Although their claims had been 
examined in detail, they argued that they had been deprived of their rights to a fair hearing 
since they were not given the opportunity to respond to concerns about their credibility and 
suspected fabrication of their stories.  The court dismissed their appeal on the basis that, apart 
from Vietnamese refugees, the legislature had not intended to fetter the discretion of the 
Director of Immigration and therefore those claiming political persecution could not access 
any special rights.129  The court reasoned that a litigant could not rely on customary 
international law ‘in the face of inconsistent domestic legislation’.130 
The CA, in Madam Lee Bun, and Hartmann J., in C, based their conclusions on three main 
grounds: 1) the lack of extension of the Refugee Convention to Hong Kong; 2) the 
legislature’s enactment of specific provisions regarding Vietnamese refugees in the 1980s 
and 90s but not other classes of asylum seekers; and 3) the immigration reservation to the 
ICCPR as it applies to Hong Kong.  In fact, Hartmann J. claims, that he would have come to 
the same conclusion ‘if the [CA] had made no such judgment and if the matter had come 
before [him] as an entirely new issue’.131  His adoption of the earlier judgment’s approach, 
however, demonstrates his failure to recognize the impact of constitutional rights and the 
limitations of the immigration reservation to situations which do not amount to violations of 
non-derogable rights or rules of customary international law, as discussed above. 
Hartmann J.’s reliance on this case is also flawed because it was decided in 1990 
before the enactment of the Bill of Rights or the Basic Law which have implemented many of 
Hong Kong’s international human rights obligations into domestic law including an implicit 
right to non-refoulement.  Hong Kong courts have confirmed the need to distinguish current 
cases involving human rights from those decided before the Bill of Rights and/or the Basic 
Law came into force.132  If the court in Madam Lee Bun could have considered these 
provisions, it may have reached a different conclusion.   
In addition, the case was decided without the benefit of the Human Rights 
Committee’s General Comment issued in 1994 which clarified that states may not take out 
reservations to limit rights which reflect principles of customary international law.133  
Hartmann J. cites Chan To Foon’s conclusion that the Director of Immigration is not bound 
by the ICCPR when applying Hong Kong’s immigration laws but he does not consider the 
                                                          
129 Ibid., paras. 90 and 138. 
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132 W v. H [2008] HKEC 766. 
133 Human Rights Committee, n. 115 above.  
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court’s distinction between peremptory norms and the family-related rights which were at 
issue in that case.134 
 
3.2.4 The Non-extension Policy and Conflation of Non-refoulement with other Refugee 
Rights 
 
Hartmann J. also appears to accept the reasoning in Madam Lee Bun that Hong Kong’s 
rejection of the Refugee Convention provides further evidence of inconsistency between 
Hong Kong law and non-refoulement.  Non-application of a treaty in and of itself, however, 
does not preclude a rule set forth in that treaty from binding a non-state party as a rule of 
customary international law.135  Also, Hartmann J.’s discussion of the Refugee Convention in 
the judgment often reflects a mistaken conflation of what should be regarded as distinct 
protection obligations in the Refugee Convention.  The first is the Convention’s requirement 
that states provide specific refugee rights, flowing from recognition of their ‘legal status’, and 
the second is the more basic right to non-refoulement which also derives from customary 
international law and international human rights law.   
McAdam clarifies this distinction noting that in the Refugee Convention, ‘[p]rotection 
comprises two elements: the threshold qualification (refugee) [underscored by the principle 
of non-refoulement] and the rights that attach (status)’.136  While arguing that ‘persons 
protected by the extended principle of non-refoulement ought to receive a legal status 
equivalent to that accorded by the Refugee Convention’,137 she acknowledges that ‘[t]here is 
not yet a consistent understanding of what that resultant legal status should entail’.138 
 [w]hile the [Torture Convention], [European Convention on Human Rights], 
ICCPR, and [Convention on the Rights of the Child] provide important curbs 
on States’ power to expel aliens, they are presently incomplete forms of 
protection.  A State may have an obligation not to deport, but the question 
remains as to what extent it is then responsible to take measures allowing the 
individual to exist and subsist.  Whereas a State’s recognition of a person as a 
Convention refugee leads to the conferral of Convention status, no similar 
                                                          
134 n. 13 above, para. 147. 
135 n. 55 above, arts. 34-8. 
136 McAdam, n. 70 above.  For a comprehensive account of the rights of refugees provided by the Refugee 
Convention see Hathaway, n. 18 above. 
137 Ibid. (McAdam), 5. 
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grant of rights currently stems from protection under human rights law.  
Crucially, the extent of protection provided by these treaties is safety from 
refoulement.139 
In RV v Director of Immigration, a case decided shortly after C, Hartmann J. himself seems 
to recognize this distinction between a right to non-refoulement and other rights related to the 
refugee experience.140  The applicant in this case was an asylum seeker from Cameroon who 
had lodged refugee and torture claims with both the UNHCR and the Hong Kong 
immigration authorities.  He had entered Hong Kong on a false passport and faced 
prosecution for this offence, although his refugee and torture claims had not yet been 
determined.  He applied for judicial review of the decision to prosecute.  In the judgment, 
Hartmann J. claimed that non-refoulement of a successful torture claimant has become a 
‘peremptory norm of customary international law, incorporated into Hong Kong’s domestic 
law’.141  He then reasoned that although Hong Kong had ‘taken on the obligation not to 
refoule a person who is at risk of torture and, in determining that issue, has set up a screening 
process’ this obligation could be distinguished from a right not to be prosecuted.  ‘Nothing 
has been put before me … to suggest that [Hong Kong] has, integral to its obligations under 
the Convention against Torture and/or under customary international law, undertaken never 
to prosecute a claimant who has entered Hong Kong illegally, no matter what the 
circumstances of that illegal entry’.142  While this lack of provision for other refugee-specific 
rights may be unsatisfactory - and Hong Kong needs to consider appropriate policy and legal 
reforms to fill this gap – it does not diminish Hong Kong’s legal obligation to respect non-
refoulement.143 
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Hartmann J. also appears to mistakenly conflate non-refoulement with the concept of 
asylum.  For example, in order to support his argument that Hong Kong has repudiated the 
rule of non-refoulement, he reasons ‘that the Hong Kong Government has purposefully 
distanced itself from the process of determining who is a refugee and thereafter where best 
that refugee may be settled in the world in order specifically to avoid compromising its 
position that it has no policy of granting political asylum’.144  He also mentions the right to 
seek asylum in article 14(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stating that it is ‘a 
proclamation of ethical values, rather than legal norms’, adding that ‘such rights must yield to 
the express requirements of domestic laws and, as I have said earlier, I am satisfied that such 
laws, both by what they say and what they omit to say, create no ambiguity.’145 He concludes 
by affirming that he is ‘satisfied that the rule of customary international law prohibiting 
refoulment of refugees has not been incorporated into Hong Kong domestic law’.146  As 
Hathaway explains, however, ‘non-refoulement is not the same as a right to asylum from 
persecution’.147  He notes that ‘the duty of non-refoulement … does not affirmatively 
establish a duty on the part of states to receive refugees … States parties may … deny entry 
to refugees so long as there is no real chance that their refusal will result in the return of the 
refugee to face the risk of being persecuted.’148  Therefore, a firm policy not to grant asylum 
does not, in and of itself, support a repudiation of non-refoulement.   
A number of past and current government statements also support the contention that 
Hong Kong’s non-extension policy does not indicate a rejection of non-refoulement nor 
inconsistency with the principle in customary international law.  These statements 
demonstrate that the non-extension policy is aimed at preventing refugees from coming to 
Hong Kong in the first place but that once they arrive they will not be refouled.   
The history of refugees in Hong Kong has led to a paradox:  while Hong Kong owes 
much of its success as an international city to the integration of large numbers of migrants 
from the Chinese mainland and elsewhere, fears exist that further influxes would undermine 
its economy and way of life.  The prevention of ‘floodgates’, Hong Kong’s small 
geographical size, and a desire to avoid abuse of the system are themes underpinning the 
official position. 
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The view that refugees are undesirable because they use public resources and that 
government provision of social services would act as a ‘pull factor’ date back to the 1950s 
when more than a million refugees fled mainland China after the communist revolution in 
1949.149  Chui describes similar attitudes after the Vietnamese refugees began arriving in the 
mid-1970s, observing that Hong Kong people exhibited ‘parochialism and defensiveness’ in 
part because of strong negative public reaction to the large numbers of Vietnamese ‘boat 
people’.150  He writes that ‘the local people have been agitated both by the large sum of 
revenue spent on building camps for the Vietnamese, as well as by the occasional disorder 
within the camp in the vicinity of open camps’.151 
Some commentators have claimed that the Hong Kong Government deliberately 
denied the Vietnamese access to adequate social services and detained them in camps in order 
to discourage further flows to the territory.152  In Chieng A Lac v the Director of 
Immigration,153 a case challenging the detention of Vietnamese asylum seekers, the 
Government confirmed this deterrence approach.  The Assistant Director for Immigration and 
the Head of the Vietnamese Refugees Branch maintained that: 
… If the effectiveness of the detention policy is not preserved, or is perceived 
as being not preserved, it would provide a magnet for an unlimited invasion 
from Vietnam.  Furthermore, it would not be acceptable to the residents of 
Hong Kong and would cause security and public order problems.  Hong Kong 
is already overcrowded with some of the densest areas of population in the 
world.  It is already the focus for massive illegal immigration from China with 
whom the population here has close ties of family and kinship, a problem 
which is dealt with rigorously by detention and removal of illegal immigrants.  
Any departure from its pronounced detention policy in terms of illegal 
immigrants from Vietnam would be severely criticised and would lead to 
resentment and public outcry.154  
This mindset has lingered since the closure of the Vietnamese camps and continues to 
affect government policy, even in the current context which does not amount to a mass influx 
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situation.155  In 2005, officials from the Immigration Department expressed similar concerns 
that extension of the Refugee Convention and provision of greater protection could attract a 
larger number of asylum seekers.156  At a meeting of the welfare services and security panels 
of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council in July 2006, the administration explicitly linked the 
policy of non-extension of the Refugee Convention to the past Vietnamese refugee 
‘problem’.157  According to the minutes of the meeting, one official worried about ‘the drastic 
surge in asylum seekers’, noting that the UNHCR’s success rate was low, and reasoned that 
‘around 85-90% of the claimants were not genuine refugees’.158  He went on to compare the 
current situation with the Vietnamese refugee ‘problem’ in the 1980s concluding ‘that there 
was a strong case not to cause the extension of the Convention to Hong Kong so as to prevent 
possible abuses of the existing mechanisms’.159 
At the same meeting, another government representative reinforced the connection 
between past experiences and current policies and their objectives when discussing the 
financial costs to Hong Kong.  She ‘drew members’ attention to the Vietnamese refugee 
problems in the 1980s, which has brought us a financial burden of [HK]$8.7 billion in 
providing assistance to them’160 and reiterated ‘that given Hong Kong’s unique situation, 
such as the dense population, economic prosperity in the region, and liberal visa regime, it 
would make Hong Kong vulnerable to possible abuses if the Convention were to be extended 
to Hong Kong’.161 
In October 2008, the Hong Kong Government reiterated before the UN Committee 
against Torture its ‘firm policy not to grant asylum’ and indicated that it has ‘no plan to 
extend to Hong Kong the application of the [Refugee Convention]’.162  It justified this 
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approach by claiming that ‘Hong Kong is small in size and has a dense population’ and its 
‘unique situation, set against the backdrop of … relative economic prosperity in the region 
and [a] liberal visa regime, makes [Hong Kong] vulnerable to possible abuses if the 
Convention were to be extended ...’163  Again, this statement intimates that the objectives 
behind non-extension are connected to fears that the provision of rights could draw refugee 
claimants to the territory and encourage disingenuous applications.  It does not, however, 
indicate that non-extension is aimed at avoiding a duty of non-refoulement which can be 
characterized, in contrast, as a duty of restraint.164 
Notably, past and current Government statements have not contained similar 
arguments with respect to non-refoulement and have not suggested that returning refugees to 
their countries of origin would resolve these issues.  While Hong Kong’s refugee policy has 
been described generally as ‘ambivalent’,165 the Government has not shown ambivalence 
toward non-refoulement.  Indeed, once asylum seekers have arrived, the Director of 
Immigration exercises his general discretion provided by the Immigration Ordinance166 and 
allows them to remain in Hong Kong until the resolution of their claims.  In fact policies 
designed to avoid attracting refugees implicitly, and perhaps ironically, underscore the 
Government’s recognition of its non-refoulement obligations.  In other words, it does not 
want to attract asylum seekers because it knows it may not return them.   
This acceptance of non-refoulement is implicit in the Government’s arrangement with 
the UNHCR as well as the scope of Hong Kong’s human rights commitments.  The UNHCR 
has stated that: 
In the absence of necessary refugee-related legislation and procedures, the HKSAR’s 
cooperation with UNHCR has demonstrated the respect for the principle of non-
refoulement and to the protection of refugees and asylum-seekers in Hong Kong.  
Among other aspects, this cooperation includes de facto respect for UNHCR’s refugee 
status determination process and the withholding of deportation of persons who are 
under active consideration by UNHCR.167 
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Additionally, in the event of a successful claim, the Government will not return the individual 





An acceptance of the legal basis for non-refoulement in Hong Kong – customary international 
law and/or constitutional provisions - should lead the court back to the Prabakar principles – 
as supplemented by FB - which require a consideration of the fairness of the procedures to 
ensure effective protection from non-refoulement when fundamental human rights are at 
stake.  If the CA finds that high standards of fairness require government-administered 
refugee status determination, this could result in the merging of torture and refugee screening 
procedures and possibly consideration of ICCPR claims. 
To summarize, an analysis of the judgment in C, in light of the right to non-
refoulement binding on Hong Kong, suggests several conclusions which could inform future 
appeals and other judicial review cases involving a right to non-refoulement.  Overall, the 
court failed to fully consider Hong Kong’s constitutional rights and their relevance to 
refugees which resulted in gaps in the court’s reasoning.  In particular, the constitutional right 
to non-refoulement, which overlaps significantly with – but in many ways goes beyond - the 
right to non-refoulement in the Refugee Convention, is consistent with the broader norm of 
non-refoulement in customary international law.  Given Hong Kong’s general embrace of 
human right principles, the lack of explicit protection in Hong Kong law for refugees from 
refoulement to persecution on a Convention ground does not limit the application of a far-
reaching customary norm of non-refoulement in Hong Kong.  In addition, the court 
misunderstood the significance of the policy of non-extension of the Refugee Convention 
which does not imply a repudiation of, or inconsistency with, non-refoulement.  Hartmann 
J.’s reliance on government policy statements to reason that Hong Kong law and practice has 
been inconsistent with the principle of non-refoulement in customary international law, fails 
to consider the distinction between different protection obligations in the Refugee 
Convention.168  Finally, Hartmann J. did not consider the limits of the immigration exception 
in the Bill of Rights when the rights at stake reflect rules of customary international law. 
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Although some decisions, such as Prabakar and FB, have resulted in limited success 
in achieving protection for torture claimants from refoulement, the analysis of the gaps in C 
demonstrates that greater scope exists for the application of constitutional rights by the courts 
in judicial review proceedings involving asylum seekers.  The courts have played a key role 
in the development of nascent refugee protections and further reliance on human rights could 
strengthen these measures. 
This article presents only a partial assessment of Hong Kong’s recent refugee-related 
adjudication, however, and the non-refoulement cases form part of a broader litigation 
strategy pursued by refugee advocates in Hong Kong.  A number of other cases have tested – 
and continue to test - the extent of Hong Kong’s other obligations toward refugees and torture 
claimants based on international human rights standards.  Some have dealt with economic 
and social rights, including the rights to social welfare169 and employment.170  Another 
judgment handed down by the CA in July 2008 considered the right not to be arbitrarily 
detained and triggered changes in Hong Kong’s detention policy.171  Some individuals who 
had been detained under the previous policy were awarded damages for unlawful detention 
by a court in March 2009.172 
Advocacy efforts outside the courts have also influenced policy developments and the 
combination of legal approaches and increasing public discourse has led to incremental but 
important changes to Hong Kong’s refugee policy.  Authorities have responded to lobbying 
by NGOs, media reports highlighting the plight of refugees locally, discussions with 
government officials initiated by members of the Legislative Council, and concluding 
observations issued by UN human rights treaty bodies. 
Several of the UN human rights treaty bodies have underscored the connection 
between Hong Kong’s implementation of its obligations under key human rights instruments 
and its treatment of refugees and have criticized Hong Kong’s lack of refugee law and 
relevant procedures.  For example, the Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of 
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Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) expressed concern at the situation of women 
asylum seekers and refugees in Hong Kong and urged the Government to extend the Refugee 
Convention to its territory.173  The Committee on the Rights of the Child commented on 
discrimination against refugee and asylum seeking children and the lack of guarantees of 
access to education.174  The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights remarked 
on Hong Kong’s lack of a clear asylum policy and recommended the extension of the 
Refugee Convention.175  In 2000, the Committee against Torture ‘noted with concern that 
practices in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region relating to refugees may not be in 
full conformity with article 3 of the Convention’ and recommended correcting the 
situation.176  In its 2009 concluding observations on China’s state report, the Committee also 
mentioned the absence of a ‘legal regime governing asylum and establishing a fair and 
efficient refugee status determination procedure’.177  In September 2009, the Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination wrote in its concluding observations on China’s 
report that ‘[w]hile noting the planned legislative framework for torture claimants in Hong 
Kong SAR, the Committee is concerned that the State party has not adopted a refugee law as 
such, including a screening procedure for asylum claims’.178 
Although this examination of judicial approaches to non-refoulement in Hong Kong 
points to an important role for the courts in securing refugee protection, this avenue for policy 
change remains constrained by the slow pace of litigation, insufficient statutory measures, 
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and lack of obligations under the Refugee Convention.  NGOs and lawyers representing 
refugees continue to advocate for extension of the Refugee Convention and Protocol to Hong 
Kong.  Hathaway notes the continuing relevance of the rights set out in the Refugee 
Convention since ‘general human rights norms do not address many refugee-specific 
concerns’179 and McAdam observes that ‘human rights law enhances and extends these 
rights, but only the Refugee Convention creates a mechanism – refugee status – by which 
they attach, and which does not permit derogation’.180  McAdam, while not discounting ‘the 
value of international human rights law’, argues ‘that it does not provide an adequate basis on 
its own for crafting a clear set of entitlements recognized at the national level for persons 
with a complementary protection need’.181  Refugee Convention standards, in combination 
with human rights provisions already applicable to Hong Kong, would provide a more solid 
foundation for the realization of the full range of refugee rights.  The Refugee Convention, as 
supplemented by its Protocol, still forms the basis for establishing a legal status for refugees 
which provides more comprehensive protection at the domestic level and a range of rights 
explicitly relevant to the refugee context. 
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